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THE MYSTERY OF LIFE IN THE LABORATORY OF 
DEMOCRACY:  PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN STATE 
LAW 
ADAM J. MACLEOD* 
Recent controversies, such as enactment of an individual mandate to purchase 
health insurance and the legalization of assisted suicide in Washington and 
Montana, have renewed the war over personal autonomy.  Debates about the value 
and limits of personal autonomy also play major roles in the controversies over 
abortion, same-sex intimacy, and same-sex marriage.  On one side of the autonomy 
war, advocates of unfettered individual freedom assert that by her un-coerced and 
autonomous choice the individual person determines the value of human goods such 
as life, health, and marriage. 
On the other side, proponents of strong government restrictions on personal 
choice hold that personal autonomy conflicts with personal responsibility.  This view 
is used to support strong government restrictions not only on assisted suicide and 
marriage, but also on the consumption of drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol; and 
recently on economic activities, such as the decision on whether to purchase health 
insurance. 
This article attempts to carve a path between the two sides in this autonomy war.  
It begins by bringing into dialogue with each other four of the most influential legal 
philosophers of our day: Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, and Robert 
George.  Each of these four scholars makes bold and instructive claims about the 
value and limits of personal autonomy.  The article then examines several different 
areas of state law where one might expect a principle of autonomy to be implicated, 
and articulates six important lessons that one can glean from state law about the 
relationship between personal autonomy and other human goods. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE AUTONOMY WAR 
Debates about personal autonomy today play major roles in controversial legal 
and political debates.  Arguments in favor of legal rights for assisted suicide,1 
abortion,2 same-sex intimacy3 and same-sex marriage,4 and for an expansive 
religious liberty to engage in self-harmful conduct5 often share a common 
presupposition: that by her un-coerced and autonomous choice the individual person 
determines the value of certain human goods, such as life, health, and marriage.  On 
this account, the law’s reach must be curtailed (or, in the case of same-sex marriage 
supplanting conjugal marriage, a private association should no longer enjoy a 
privileged place in law) so that the individual can exercise her autonomy in a 
capacious legal environment.  Particularly in matters of religion, morals, and self-
harm, where the conduct at issue is perceived not to affect third parties, the principle 
of personal autonomy is understood to militate in favor of more freedom rather than 
less.  Laws that deflect self-harmful conduct are thought to fail to respect the 
individual’s claim to personal autonomy. 
On the other side of the debate many prominent thinkers and lawmakers hold that 
personal autonomy conflicts with personal responsibility.  Give people too much 
freedom, these folks argue, and they will become irresponsible citizens.  Some goods 
cannot be realized unless citizens are coerced to contribute to the collective good of 
all. 
Thus two conflicting views about the value and limitations of autonomy have 
arisen.  They are easily caricatured because they are both so extreme.  On one hand, 
the belief that personal autonomy militates in favor of ever-expansive liberty is 
generally expressed with no limitations.  This view found its most famous 
expression in Justice Kennedy’s now well-worn claim from Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, 
and education . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
                                                          
 
1
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
 
2
 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 
3
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-74 (2003). 
 
4
 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 
5
 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See also ANDY 
G. OLREE, THE CHOICE PRINCIPLE: THE BIBLICAL CASE FOR LEGAL TOLERATION 130-47 
(2006). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.6 
This conception of constitutional protections places personal autonomy on an exalted 
perch, above the other human goods that Justice Kennedy alluded to.  The value of 
other human goods such as life, marriage, and knowledge is determined by 
individual choice.  These other goods are thus reflexive in nature, meaning that they 
have intelligible value only if, and to the extent that, they are freely chosen by 
individual persons. 
This article will refer to this caricatured conception as “Untrammeled 
Autonomy.”  The Untrammeled Autonomy caricature will be used to refer to Justice 
Kennedy’s mystery-of-life passage from Casey and any principle that takes personal 
autonomy as a conclusive reason for action as against human goods such as life, 
marriage, and the other “attributes of personhood.”7 Though there is disagreement 
about the implications of Untrammeled Autonomy, the idea expressed in Casey has 
found assent among both so-called “conservative”8 and so-called “liberal”9 judges of 
both federal10 and state11 judiciaries. 
On the other side of the autonomy battle is a view, also caricatured for purposes 
of clarity, which perceives little or no value in personal autonomy.  According to this 
view, the government ought to play a strong role in directing citizens to personal 
responsibility.  This view is used to support strong government restrictions not only 
on assisted suicide and marriage, but also on the consumption of drugs, cigarettes, 
and alcohol, and recently on economic activities, such as the decision whether to 
purchase health insurance. 
Proponents of this conception of personal autonomy sometimes occupy opposite 
ends of the political spectrum.  At one end, some religious figures can be found 
calling for the codification of “Judeo-Christian principles” in positive law in order to 
ensure the moral uprightness of citizens.12  At the other end, many of the 
justifications for the landmark health care legislation that Congress enacted in 2010, 
                                                          
 
6
 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 
7
 Id. 
 
8
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, for Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 
 
9
 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-61 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
 
10
 See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 
11
 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003). 
 
12
 D. JAMES KENNEDY WITH JIM NELSON BLACK, CHARACTER & DESTINY, A NATION IN 
SEARCH OF ITS SOUL 33, 243 (1994). Kennedy denied that secular government “can invent 
rules and a system of order without regard for God’s perfect law,” and claimed, “Morality is 
the only thing you can legislate!” Id. (emphasis original). Far from threatening freedom, 
Kennedy believed that his theonomous proposal would promote freedom. Freedom, especially 
freedom of thought and expression, comes not from recognizing personal autonomy but rather 
from following Christian principles.  Id. at 33. 
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which includes a mandate that every American purchase health insurance,13 rest on 
the principle that the government should direct citizens to take responsible, moral 
action to ensure “that everybody should have some basic security when it comes to 
their health care.”14  This principle trumps the freedom to choose how to pay for 
one’s health care because Americans have a “shared responsibility” to contribute to 
health insurance coverage for everyone.15 
As in the Untrammeled Autonomy camp, there exist wide divergences of views 
among those who believe that the government should coerce its citizens to exercise 
personal or collective responsibility.  But for simplicity, this article will refer to this 
caricatured view of autonomy as “Authoritative Paternalism.” 
The combatants in this conflict often move their debate to the national level and 
seek to apply their principles to particular, controversial issues in federal law.  The 
stakes are high in controversial disputes, such as the justness of assisted suicide and 
the definition of marriage.  Nationalizing these issues raises the stakes even higher.  
There remains little room for consensus, much less reasoned understanding, when 
these issues are nationalized, as when the United States Supreme Court creates a 
constitutional right to perform a controversial action,16 or where Congress and the 
President forbid an action (such as marijuana use) the immorality of which is a 
matter of some doubt, and which the states might otherwise permit in some 
instances.17  Gains for one side must be obtained at the expense of the other, and the 
autonomy war becomes a zero-sum conflict. 
This warfare over personal autonomy has at times overlooked two important 
sources of insight.  First, much can be learned about the interaction between personal 
autonomy and other human goods in state law.  State law contains many insights on 
the relationship between autonomy and other goods and it frequently informs federal 
courts’ interpretation of ambiguous or contested constitutional provisions.  In Justice 
Brandeis’s famous word picture, the states are laboratories for policy-making, which 
conduct “experimentation in things social and economic.”18  Especially when the 
courts consider claims of fundamental rights, they would be better equipped to 
address these claims if they understood the contours, forcefulness, and limitations of 
                                                          
 
13
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010)). 
 
14
 Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform 
Bill, WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (March 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-
health-insurance-reform-bill. 
 
15
 Robert Pear, Obama Open to a Mandate on Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/health/policy/04health.html. This language found 
its way into the legislation itself. The heading for the provision of the act that contains the 
individual mandate is titled, “Shared Responsibility for Health Care.” OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. 
COUNSEL, 111TH CONG., COMPILATION OF PATIENT PROT. AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 143 
(2010). 
 
16
 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
 
17
 In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the criminal 
prohibition in United States federal law against the possession of marijuana preempts more 
permissive state laws. 
 
18
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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the personal autonomy principle on which they are being asked to rely.  Much of this 
can be gleaned from studying the laws of the states. 
Second, none of the landmark cases, and almost none of the scholarly literature, 
consider the value of autonomy in the context of the basic human goods in favor of 
which it is exercised.  This is a serious deficiency because, as a result, many people 
view personal autonomy as binary, either implicated or not in any particular issue.  
But by considering the instrumental value of autonomy in its service of extrinsic 
ends one realizes that personal autonomy is a multi-faceted good.  It is neither 
absolutely valuable nor entirely lacking in value.  Rather, its value is contingent 
upon the uses to which it is put. 
This article will begin in Part II with a brief sketch of the recent work that legal 
philosophers have done to understand the relationship between personal autonomy 
and other human goods.  Part III will then proceed to examine what state lawmakers 
have said about the question, and what can be learned from their enactments.  This 
article will only scratch the surface of the insights that state law has to offer about 
the relationships between personal autonomy and other human goods.  The approach 
here is shallow and broad. 
In the end, state law teaches six important lessons about the relationship between 
personal autonomy and other human goods. These are: 
 
1. Personal autonomy is an important condition of pre-moral choosing 
among basic human goods. 
2. The state properly restricts exercises of personal autonomy that 
cause harm. 
3. Personal autonomy is an important condition of the realization of 
reflexive basic goods. 
4. Some autonomous acts are valueless. 
5. Not all basic goods appear to be reflexive. 
6. Neither a principle of personal autonomy nor the unconditional 
value of some basic goods conclusively resolves every controversial 
issue. 
II.  PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND BASIC HUMAN GOODS 
A.  Four Thoughtful Accounts of Autonomy 
Many serious jurisprudential scholars have in recent decades turned their 
attention to the problem of personal autonomy and the realization of human goods 
and have helped to carve a path between Untrammeled Autonomy and Authoritative 
Paternalism.  This part will consider four of the most thoughtful accounts of personal 
autonomy, those of Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, John Finnis, and Robert George.  
All four affirm the value of personal autonomy.  Dworkin considers autonomy an 
essential element of a life lived well.19  Raz considers autonomy a basic human good, 
having intrinsic value and thus constituting a reason for choice and action in and of 
itself.20  Finnis takes autonomy to be an important precondition to the realization of 
certain human goods, such as friendship, practical reasonableness, and religious 
                                                          
 
19
 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 84-94 (1994). 
 
20
 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 7, 390-395 (1986). 
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exercise, which can be realized only if they are freely chosen.21  And George asserts 
that the free choice exercised in an autonomous act makes right actions more perfect 
than they would be if coerced.22 
All four of these thinkers also recognize important limitations upon the reach and 
value of personal autonomy.  Dworkin recognizes the fundamental conviction that 
one cannot make a wrong action right simply by choosing it; “a person’s thinking a 
given choice right for him does not make it so.”23  Raz observes that personal 
autonomy is subject to the contingencies of “appropriate mental abilities, an 
adequate range of options, and independence.”24  And Finnis and George, while 
affirming the important instrumental value of personal autonomy, both deny that 
autonomy is valuable in and of itself.25 
The remainder of this part will bring these four thinkers into dialogue with each 
other.  The object will be not to resolve any differences among them but rather to use 
their points of agreement, and points on which they can be reconciled, to frame the 
consideration of state laws’ treatment of autonomy, which follows. 
B.  A Conversation 
Raz provides a helpful definition of personal autonomy.  The “ruling idea” is 
“that people should make their own lives” by choice.26  Personal autonomy is an 
“ideal of self-creation.”27  In embracing goals and commitments and remaining true 
to them one “gives shape to one’s life, determines what would count as a successful 
life and what would be a failure.”28  Dworkin, Finnis, and George agree with Raz 
that people can, to some extent, create their own reasons for action simply by 
choosing to do so.  As Finnis observes, where one is faced with a choice between 
two incompatible but equally-reasonable options, it is the act of choosing itself, the 
exercise of free will, which settles the question.29 
                                                          
 
21
 JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 20-24 (1991) 
[hereinafter “FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES”]; John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 
45 MERCER L. REV. 687, 694-95 (1994) [hereinafter “Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law”]. 
 
22
 ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 176-
77 (1993). 
 
23
 DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 206. 
 
24
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 372. 
 
25
 GEORGE, supra note 22, at 175-80; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
85-90 (1980) [hereinafter “FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS”]; Finnis, Liberalism 
and Natural Law, supra note 21, at 691-92. 
 
26
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 369. This is true even for people who deny the value of 
autonomy.  Id.  They, like everyone else, are better off living autonomous lives than non-
autonomous lives.   Id. 
 
27
 Id. at 370. 
 
28
 Id. at 387. 
 
29
 FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58. The act of choosing rationally “is 
creative of personal character, and thus of a most significant aspect of the reality of each 
person who is capable of meaningful relations with other persons.”  Id.  It demonstrates the 
capacity, so unique to human beings, to establish “some meaningful relationship between his 
or her feelings, understanding, judgments, and actions.”  Id. 
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For this reason, a person’s life consists in part of values and reasons of his own 
making.  But Raz hastens to reject the “exaggerated . . . doctrine of arbitrary self-
creation,” which holds that all value derives from choice which is itself not guided 
by value.30  Raz insists, “[a]utonomy requires a choice of goods.  A choice between 
good and evil is not enough.”31  Likewise, Finnis denies that all reasons for action 
are created by choice; some human goods simply are good, apart from free choice.32  
And George insists that the “suitability of objects of choice” must be judged “by 
reference to standards sufficiently impersonal and objective to be counted as 
reasons.”33  Otherwise, actions cannot be chosen for reasons, but only for desires, 
appetites, and other sub-rational preferences.  Thus these thinkers substantially agree 
that personal autonomy is not the most fundamental value.  Respect for personal 
autonomy entails respect for other equally-fundamental human goods, such as life, 
health, and marriage, as well. 
To see why this is so, it is important to consider how personal autonomy is 
actually exercised.  Raz explains that the achievement of autonomy requires not 
merely freedom from coercion but also a range of acceptable options from which to 
choose.34  “One cannot have an option to be a barrister, a surgeon, or a psychiatrist in 
a society where those professions, and the institutions their existence presupposes, 
do not exist.”35  Because humans are essentially social creatures, and share common 
views about which options are worthwhile, many common goods are, in fact, both 
common and intrinsically good.36  Finnis explains that the commonality of goods 
does not entail “that the members of a community must all have the same values or 
objectives.”37  But there must be “some set (or set of sets) of conditions which needs 
to obtain if each of the members is to obtain his own objectives.”38 
In other words, the achievement of personal autonomy entails that the individual 
is not free to determine the value of all goods.  In order to make one’s own reasons 
and projects through the exercise of personal autonomy one must respect pre-
existing, objective reasons not of one’s own making.  Some find this insight counter-
intuitive.  But careful consideration reveals considerable merit in it. 
So to have acceptable options one must discover other objective goods, which are 
at least equally as valuable as autonomy, which one shares in common with other 
                                                          
 
30
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 387-88. 
 
31
 Id. at 379. 
 
32
 See discussion infra. 
 
33
 GEORGE, supra note 22, at 154. 
 
34
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 148-57. Raz distinguishes between the capacity to achieve 
autonomy and the achievement of autonomy.  Id.  Autonomy as a capacity requires freedom 
from coercion.  Autonomy as achievement requires more.  Id. at 203-05.  The ideal of 
autonomy cannot be achieved without “having a sufficient range of acceptable options.”  Id. at 
205. 
 
35
 Id.  
 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 156. 
 
38
 Id. 
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people, and which provide reasons to choose them.39  Finnis has helpfully identified 
these other goods.  They are life (including health), knowledge, play, aesthetic 
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness (what some call reasonable action or 
morally-upright choosing), and order with ultimate reality (what Finnis “summarily 
and lamely,” in his words, called “religion”).40  From these basic goods all other 
human goods derive their value. 
These basic goods are common in several senses.  They are good for all and 
known to all.41  That people disagree about what is good does not entail that all 
goods are subjective; knowledge, for example, simply is better than ignorance.42 
Also, realization of the goods is neither an individual project (as Untrammeled 
Autonomy proponents would have it) nor a matter of the collective good of the 
greatest number (as many Authoritative Paternalists would portray the matter).  
Rather, one participates in goods with others in projects of cooperation and common 
commitment.43  Thus, the “common good” is not collective in the utilitarian sense of 
the greatest aggregate good for the greatest number,44 which necessarily contradicts 
or overrides the goods (and autonomy) of individuals.  Rather, the “common good” 
                                                          
 
39
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 205-06. 
 
40
 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 85-90. In a later writing, 
Finnis provided a slightly modified list, identifying the basic goods as (1) knowledge; (2) 
skillful performance in work and play; (3) bodily life and the components of its fullness, such 
as health and safety; (4) friendship and association between persons; (5) conjugal marriage; 
(6) practical reasonableness; and (7) “harmony with the widest reaches and most ultimate 
source of all reality, including meaning and value.” Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law, 
supra note 21, at 691-92.  The point here is not to nail down a precise and comprehensive list 
but rather to observe that there are basic goods, that they are at least equally as basic as 
personal autonomy. 
 
41
 Finnis observes that all human societies show concern for these goods, or some forms or 
instantiations of these goods, and the practical principles that guide their realization.  FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 83-84.  Though no value is 
recognized at all times, in all places, in the same way, anthropologists find with “striking 
unanimity” that the basic goods are known to all societies in some way.  Id. at 83.  The basic 
goods are “good for any and every person.”  Id. at 155. 
 
42
 Finnis observes that, in moving from an inclination toward knowledge to a grasp of its 
self-evident value, “[o]ne finds oneself reflecting that ignorance and muddle are to be avoided, 
simply as such and not merely in relation to a closed list of questions that one has raised.”  Id. 
at 61.  One recognizes that a “well-informed and clear-headed person” is well-off, not merely 
because he can make instrumental use of his knowledge, and profit from it, but it is good for 
everyone to know.  Id.  And this holds not merely for oneself and one’s own interests, “but at 
large.”  Id. 
 
43
 To illustrate, Finnis holds up the basic good of friendship: “For A to be B’s friend, A 
must act (at least in substantial part) for the sake of B’s well-being, and must value B’s well-
being for the sake of B.  A must treat B’s well-being as an aspect of his (A’s) own well-
being.”  Id. at 142-43.  But the same is also true of B: “It follows that A must value his (A’s) 
own well-being for the sake of B, while B must value his (B’s) own well-being for the sake of 
A. And so on. The reciprocity of love does not come to rest at either pole.”  Id. at 143. 
 
44
 Id. at 154.  Because the basic goods are incommensurable, this consequentialist 
calculation is unworkable, incoherent, and irrational.  Id. at 111-18; RAZ, supra note 20, at 
321-66. 
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refers to “the factor or set of factors . . . which, as considerations in someone’s 
practical reasoning, would make sense of or give reason for his collaboration with 
others and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their 
collaboration with each other and with him.”45 
But nor is the common good realized merely through individual choice.  Indeed, 
personal autonomy itself cannot be reconciled with moral individualism.  As Raz 
observed, the associations and institutions that form around joint participations in the 
good are essential predicates of the exercise of personal autonomy because they 
make available a range of adequate options in which individuals might choose to 
participate.46  For this reason, Raz recognized that moral individualism is 
incompatible with personal autonomy.47 
All of this causes Ronald Dworkin to feel a tension in moral reasoning.  On one 
hand, one’s commitment to a particular conception of the good is part of what makes 
that commitment valuable for that individual person.48  On the other hand is the 
“even more fundamental conviction” that some conceptions of the good are 
mistaken, “that a person’s thinking a given choice right for him does not make it 
so.”49  Moral reasoning is thus a process of both choice and judgment.50  This tension 
between choice and judgment poses for Dworkin a dichotomy.  The significant value 
of autonomous choice, and the integrity it safeguards, pulls Dworkin toward “the 
annihilating idea that critical interests are only subjective, only matters of how we 
feel.”51  The belief that some choices are wrong pulls him toward the “equally 
unacceptable idea that everyone’s critical interests are the same, over all history, that 
there is only one truly best way for anyone to live.”52 
Raz and George see a way out of this conundrum.  One can affirm the basic, 
unconditional value of some human goods without insisting on only one truly best 
way to live.  Raz and George both recognize “many forms of the good which are 
admitted to be so many valuable expressions of people’s nature,” while also 
affirming “that certain conceptions of the good are worthless and demeaning, and 
that political action may and should be taken to eradicate or at least curtail them.”53 
                                                          
 
45
 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 154. 
 
46
 RAZ, supra note 20, at 206. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 206. 
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 GEORGE, supra note 22, at 164 n.7 (quoting RAZ, supra note 20, at 133). 
To see why this is so, take a couple of easy cases.  A person might choose 
not to get married in order to pursue a life of religious instruction and charitable 
work.  This person has reasonably chosen to pursue the human goods of 
religious exercise and charity over the human good of marriage.  But this 
choice does not entail denigrating the value of marriage, or insisting that 
celibacy is the only way to live.  It merely reflects the reality that one must 
choose between mutually-inconsistent ends.  Similarly, one who chooses to 
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For this reason, personal autonomy and the other human goods need not conflict 
with each other.  The question is not, as proponents of Untrammeled Autonomy 
would have it, whether the state should leave people free to make autonomous 
choices.  Nor is the question, as proponents of Authoritative Paternalism would pose 
it, how much freedom citizens should have to act irresponsibly.  Rather, the question 
for lawmakers is which autonomous choices realize real human goods, and therefore 
ought to be left as matters of personal choice, and which harm the good, and can 
rightly be disincentivized or even prohibited.  That question is not an easy question 
to answer. But the judgments of state lawmakers on that question reveal some 
helpful insights. 
III.  LESSONS FROM STATE LAW 
Because state lawmakers frequently must make judgments about which ends are 
worth realizing through coercive means, it is possible to inquire more closely about 
the value and limits of autonomy by looking at state law.  This article now turns to 
examine a few, discrete areas of state law where autonomy plays a role, or is thought 
to play a role, in determining which of two (or more) policies the state should 
pursue. 
Admittedly, state lawmakers are not always, or perhaps even often, clear about 
what value they attribute to personal autonomy and other goods.  But their 
deliberations and decisions reflect definite commitments on this subject.  Those 
commitments are entitled to examination not because they are necessarily correct but 
because they provide useful starting points from which to explore the extent of 
respect state law can and should afford to personal autonomy.  Examining state law 
with a critical eye reveals some helpful lessons about the value of autonomy because 
the judgments of state lawmakers have real-world consequences, and these can be 
studied. 
Thus, the goal here is not to derive normative judgments from what state law 
currently is or from what state lawmakers have done.  Indeed, some state laws are 
bad laws precisely because they are predicated on wrong views about autonomy.  
Rather, the goal is to determine what sort of reason for action autonomy turns out to 
be after it has been tested in the laboratory of democracy. 
A.  Property Owner Sovereignty 
Lesson One: Personal Autonomy Is an Important Condition of Pre-Moral 
Choosing Among Human Goods 
 
                                                          
pursue a career in music over a career in scientific research has not judged the 
good of aesthetic experience to be objectively superior to the human good of 
knowledge, or that a career in music is the only sensible career for everyone. 
At the same time, some choices are simply worthless, and therefore 
unreasonable.  The deliberate destruction of a basic good, such as life, has no 
intelligible value.  Murder is therefore wrong, and is a fundamentally different 
choice than the decision not to conceive a child in the first instance.  Similarly, 
to choose a career in music over a career in scientific inquiry is not the same as 
obscuring scientific knowledge by, for example, falsifying the data from one’s 
research.  Destroying a basic good is not the same as not choosing to instantiate 
it in the first place. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/6
2011] THE MYSTERY OF LIFE IN THE LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY 599 
 
The control and freedom that make personal autonomy possible are on vivid 
display in the sovereignty that a property owner exercises over his assets.  State law 
accords striking respect to the owner of private property, and strongly protects the 
rights that enable him to control his asset, particularly his right to exclude others 
from it.  Civil and criminal trespass laws carve out, for the property owner, a space 
of dominion, within which he is free to use his asset for his own personal ends 
within the limitations discussed in the next part. 
1.  The Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude has clear boundaries and sharp edges.  Thus, the “midnight 
streaker who dashes unseen across the lawn of another, and who merely bends a few 
blades of grass in the process, is guilty of the tort of trespass.”54  One trespass case in 
particular reveals the impregnability of property owner sovereignty.  In Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc.,55 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a $100,000 punitive 
damages award for a trespass that resulted in no actual damages.  The Jacques forbad 
Steenberg Homes, a mobile home sale company, to cut a path across their frozen, 
snow-covered field to a neighbor’s tract.56  The only alternative course contained a 
sharp curve, was covered in seven feet of snow, and would require extra equipment 
to navigate.57  Because delivery was included in the sale price of the mobile home,58 
Steenberg Homes had a strong financial incentive to use the easier route over the 
Jacques’s land.  But the Jacques wrongly believed that permitting Steenberg Homes 
to make the delivery over their land would give rise to an adverse possession claim 
against them59 and they remained steadfast in their refusal, despite repeated 
requests.60 
Steenberg Homes delivered the mobile home over the Jacques’s property without 
permission.61  In the ensuing trespass action a jury awarded the Jacques $1 in 
nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.62  In upholding the award, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the individual property owner’s “strong interest 
in excluding trespassers.”63  But the court went further and asserted that “[s]ociety 
has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of 
protecting the interests of the individual landowner.”64  This drastic remedy was 
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necessary to preserve the “integrity of the legal system”65 and to vindicate the public 
expectation that wrongdoers should be “appropriately punished.”66 
Commenting on this decision, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have noted the 
strikingly moral tone of the court’s reasoning.  The court treated the Jacques’s right 
to exclude as a moral right, and allowed punitive damages to vindicate this right, 
“not to promote public utility by preventing violence or protecting privacy.”67  In 
other words, this is not a case about the collective good of the greatest number.  
Rather, the case illustrates the “moral side of property law.”68 
2.  Owner Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Basic Goods 
Why does state law provide such rigorous protection to the owner-sovereign?  
And why would a state high court use such strong moral language in defense of this 
protection?  A clue can be found in the purposes for which property owners exercise 
their property rights.  The point of private property is to serve human goods, such as 
life, health, personal autonomy, and practical reasonableness, the very goods that 
Finnis identified as those necessary for the exercise of personal autonomy.69  A 
person who exercises sovereignty over her assets does not always realize these 
goods, but has the resources necessary to do so.  And whatever other values it may 
serve in particular cases, sovereignty over one’s property entails free choice, an 
essential precondition to both autonomy and practical reasonableness.70  Thus 
property serves both personal autonomy and other human goods. 
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66
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 Id. at 1870, 1874. 
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 See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 165-73. 
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 See GEORGE, supra note 22, at 168, 177-78.  One can affirm this role for autonomy 
whether one takes autonomy to be a basic good or merely an instrumental good.  Raz and 
Finnis both understand autonomous choice to operate in this way.  Both affirm that a choice 
between basic goods is a choice between incommensurables, and is thus undetermined by 
reason, and that the act of choosing itself both settles the underdetermined question and 
creates a new reason for action.  RAZ, supra note 20, at 388-89; FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, 
supra note 21, at 58. 
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Property owners choose to purchase, use, encumber,71 and alienate their property 
rights (or not72) in order to realize certain ends, such as a more aesthetically-pleasing 
kitchen, an extra bedroom to accommodate new additions to the family, or the 
investment value of home ownership.  The value of these ends is generally derived 
from more basic goods, such as beauty, health, and life.  For example, the addition of 
an extra bedroom can be instrumentally valuable for its enabling the more 
fundamental end, the addition of a new child to the family, which is an instance of 
the basic human good of life. 
Property owner sovereignty is therefore consistent with George’s account of 
autonomy as instrumentally valuable.  The autonomy carved out within the 
sovereign owner’s property interest enables the owner to realize human goods other 
than autonomy, and to make pre-moral choices among mutually-exclusive 
possibilities.  But owner sovereignty is also consistent with Raz’s concept of 
autonomy-as-achievement.  Just as the achievement of autonomy requires the 
availability of acceptable options, it requires the availability of sufficient resources 
to attain those options. 
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 It is important to note that the freedom to use one’s property in order to incur an 
obligation serves, rather than limits, personal autonomy.  Property owners, like all persons, 
create moral reasons when they choose to oblige themselves.  Binding obligation is itself a 
reason for action, in part because people choose to accept obligations for intelligible reasons.  
A lessor, for example, promises to honor and to protect the lessee’s quiet use and enjoyment 
in order to gain something that he could not have obtained otherwise.  Or consider the 
decision to incur a mortgage obligation in order to purchase a home.  When one chooses to 
own (rather than rent) one’s home, one accepts the obligations associated with the loan as the 
end product of deliberative choice about one’s personal priorities and commitments in light of 
certain, fixed facts. 
Just as particular obligations follow from autonomous reflection on the good ends one 
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derived from the common good.  See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra 
note 25, at 302.  Obligation is a means of cooperation, which enhances both collective 
productivity and individual autonomy.  Id. at 303. 
Like the law, [the institution of obligation] enables past, present, and predictable 
future to be related in a stable though developing order; enables this order to be 
effected in complex interpersonal patterns; and brings all this within reach of 
individual initiative and arrangement, thus enhancing individual autonomy in the 
very process of increasing individuals’ obligations. 
Id.  Indeed, the point of the institution of binding obligation is to enable individuals to 
exercise control over their relationships within a community.  Id. at 308. 
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 Owner sovereignty must protect both the right of the owner to take action and the right 
not to take action.  Even the non-use of an asset can promote the good, as where a farmer 
allows his fields to lie fallow for a year so that they can recover.  The replenished fields 
produce higher yields in subsequent years, serving the goods of life and health.  The point of 
this central aspect of property is to give the owner freedom to choose.  And this freedom to 
choose enables the owner to realize real human goods. 
It bears repeating here that, if Raz, Finnis, and George are correct, these goods are 
common.  So, for example, a community celebrates the birth of a new human because that 
child’s life will accrue to the good of all with whom she is in community.  And the crops 
produced by the sabbatical farmer are a form of wealth that benefits both the farmer and those 
who purchase and consume the crops. 
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Benjamin Barros, in exploring what he calls the “institutional relationship” 
between property and freedom, observes that property gives people access to the 
resources that they need in order to be free.73  By carving out a zone where the state 
or community must justify interference with the owner’s sovereignty, property 
promotes the “ability of individuals to make basic life choices for themselves.”74  
But it also does more than this.  Freedom would be “an empty concept if a person 
does not have the resources to act (or refrain from acting) consistent with that 
freedom.”75  Property enables access to those resources, and frees property owners 
from being “beholden to others.”76 
Indeed, the freedom that owner sovereignty enables can be understood to 
promote autonomy, just as it promotes the other goods that the property owner 
chooses.  Free choices among possible instantiations of basic goods are pre-moral, 
meaning that they do not implicate moral principles or rules.  They are, in the 
language of moral philosophy, rationally undetermined.  One can just as reasonably 
choose to devote one’s assets and resources to being more hospitable as to producing 
crops.  The choice to be a farmer instead of a host, or a host instead of a farmer, is 
therefore autonomously made.  It is the act of choosing, in itself, that creates new 
reasons for one’s future choosing.  In the realm of pre-moral choosing among 
possible instantiations of the good one really does make one’s own life. 
Assets enable people to make their own lives by creating new reasons for their 
future actions.  People deliberate about how to use their assets because there are 
almost always countervailing options and considerations.  Choosing one end often 
entails foregoing the pursuit of alternatives, so the pre-moral good chosen must be 
chosen over other, alternative ends.  A pre-moral choice between basic goods is a 
choice between incommensurables, and is thus undetermined by reason.77  And even 
when the choice is between instrumental goods, which sometimes can be measured 
against each other such that the choice is not fully undetermined, there generally 
remains more than one reasonable option.  Moral principles will not often resolve the 
choice.  Moral side constraints seldom govern the questions whether a person should 
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rent or own a home, or remodel a kitchen or make do with the old one.  Rather, the 
person enjoys a great deal of freedom to choose. 
Where in such cases the choice between incompatible options is not settled by 
the superiority of one option over the other, or by physical, psychological, or 
economic limitations, or by legal or moral restrictions, it is the act of choosing itself, 
the exercise of free will, autonomously exercised, which settles the question.78  The 
person making the choice is in an important sense the maker or creator of the state of 
affairs that follows the choice: the education of the child; the new, more hospitable 
kitchen. 
Property promotes pluralism.  Indeed, property is the paradigmatic pluralist 
institution.  Just as one person’s notion of the good life differs from his neighbor’s, 
one person’s use of his assets to pursue the good life differs from his neighbor’s.  
But in order to work effectively, property owner sovereignty must free the property 
owner to pursue projects that others do not value.  It must honor and protect the 
freedom of the owner sovereign to choose between, for example, producing more 
food and hosting more guests. 
This is why both purely economic theories of property and theories of state 
governance of property are incomplete.  Property serves more than merely economic 
values, and thus secures the right of the owner sovereign to pursue non-economic 
ends, even when that pursuit is not in her economic best interest.  It also enables 
property owners to pursue goals that the state does not value. 
The basic goods are all truly basic and thus incommensurable; they are all 
equally fundamental reasons for action and cannot be compared with each other.  
Because the basic goods are incommensurable, and thus cannot be rationally 
measured on any single criteria, it is the property owner’s choice that determines 
which goods will predominate over others.  Sometimes this choice will not make 
sense to an economist, or to a neighbor who sees property only in economic terms.  
And the choice will often look odd to government bureaucrats. 
So, in a famous case the Connecticut Supreme Court vindicated the right of 
Helen Vealencis, a co-tenant in a tenancy in common, to force a partition of the 
tenancy in kind and to prevent a partition by sale.79  The court faulted the trial court, 
which had ordered a partition by sale, for, inter alia, looking only to economic 
considerations.80  The trial court “failed to give due consideration” to Ms. Vealencis’ 
actual and exclusive possession of part of the land, and to the facts that she had made 
her home there and derived her livelihood from her operation of a family business 
there.81  The state high court set the judgment aside and ordered a remand so that the 
trial court could consider all of Vealencis’ reasons for wanting to stay on the 
property.82 
                                                          
 
78
 FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58. 
 
79
 Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980). 
 
80
 Id. 
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
604 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:589 
 
On remand the trial court permitted Ms. Vealencis to remain on the property and 
honored Vealencis’ request for a partition in kind.83  Her decision caused her to 
suffer a significant financial loss.  Her two co-tenants developed and sold their 
allotment for $725,000; the partitioned tract that Vealencis retained was worth only 
$72,000.84  It was in the best financial interest of the parties to sell the entire property 
for residential development and divide up the proceeds.  But the value that Vealencis 
placed in the land could not be measured in money, and the law honors that value. 
Other doctrines also secure the right of the owner sovereign to choose for non-
economic reasons.  For example, the doctrine of ameliorative waste authorizes the 
owner of a future interest in property to prevent the possessory estate holder from 
improving the asset and increasing its economic value without the future interest 
holder’s consent where the improvement would permanently injure the sentimental 
or aesthetic value of the asset.  In a paradigmatic case, George Brokaw held a life 
tenancy in a mansion at the corner of 79th Street and Fifth Avenue in New York 
City.85  Operating and maintaining the mansion cost many thousands of dollars 
annually, and there was no rental market for the residence, so to preserve the 
mansion entailed significant financial loss.86  Brokaw proposed replacing the 
mansion with an apartment building.87  There existed significant demand for 
apartments, and the proposed building would, he estimated, net a $30,000 profit.88 
Nevertheless, the court sided with the future interest holders, who objected to the 
proposed demolition of the mansion.  The act of changing the estate would be a 
waste, even if it resulted in economic improvement.89  The court explained, 
The receipt by [the remaindermen] at the end of the life estate of a 13-
story $900,000 apartment house might be more beneficial to them.  
Financially, the objecting adults may be unwise in not consenting to the 
proposed change.  They may be selfish and unmindful that in the normal 
course of time and events they probably will not receive the fee.  With 
motives and purposes the court is not concerned.90 
These and other doctrines must genuinely baffle anyone who attempts to 
understand property using a single scale of values.  Indeed, any attempt to impose 
any single value system, whether economic or otherwise, upon property owners must 
result in hopeless confusion about property law.  But property law makes a lot of 
sense if the institution of property is viewed as a pluralist institution, one that honors 
and protects the rights of owner sovereigns to pursue incommensurable values in the 
exercise of their personal autonomy.  The law leaves property owners free to make 
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their own determinations about what they value and how they will use property in 
pursuit of their own values.  And this is true even if the choices of property owners 
seem odd or unwise to an outside observer. 
3.  In Service to Human Dignity 
Why should we care whether property owners have the freedom to choose to use 
their assets to make new reasons for themselves?  Freedom to choose for intelligible 
reasons, and thus to bring a new reality into being, is an essential component of 
human dignity; it is a central capacity that sets human beings apart from other 
beings.  Finnis has observed that the act of choosing rationally “is creative of 
personal character, and thus of a most significant aspect of the reality of each person 
who is capable of meaningful relations with other persons.”91  It demonstrates the 
capacity to establish “some meaningful relationship between his or her feelings, 
understanding, judgments, and actions.”92  Property owner sovereignty enables the 
exercise of this capacity.93 
Because choices about how to use property are generally pre-moral they 
epitomize the exercise of free choice in its highest and best form.  One might 
encumber one’s house with a second mortgage in order to remodel one’s kitchen and 
host more dinner parties.  Or one might assume the same mortgage obligation in 
order to further one’s education.  One can just as reasonably choose to devote one’s 
assets to being more hospitable as to acquiring knowledge.  Given finite value in the 
house one cannot choose both.  But neither is per se unreasonable or immoral.  In 
such cases, which comprise the overwhelming majority of choices about property 
use, it is the act of choosing that creates a new state of affairs. 
By using property to choose between equally-reasonable options, a property 
owner in an important sense makes her own life.  She exercises free choice to bring 
about a new state of affairs.  This is distinctly human achievement.  The practice of 
choosing freely for intelligible reasons, and by choice bringing a new reality and 
new reasons into being, is an essential component of human dignity.  Strong 
property protection secures the freedom to exercise free choice. 
A helpful lesson about the importance of property owner sovereignty to free 
choice and human dignity is found in the abolition of common law coverture.94  That 
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the common law doctrine of coverture denied to married women the opportunity to 
manage their own assets is the reason why that doctrine was unjust.  It was not 
merely a question of coverture treating men and women differently but also a matter 
of denigrating the character and personal autonomy, and thus the dignity, of married 
women. 
Around the time of the Married Women’s Property Acts,95 the Texas Supreme 
Court observed that coverture deemed the married woman, as a result of her 
marriage, “divested of her faculties as a rational being.”96  Coverture extinguished 
the married woman’s separate existence on the ground that “her reason, faculties, 
and intelligence are entombed.”97  By this process of entombment, the woman’s 
dignity before the law diminished “to her own detriment and the injury of others,”98 
who could not hold her responsible.  Meanwhile, her husband enjoyed the 
corresponding increase in dignity and sovereignty over their joint affairs.99 
When the states abolished coverture, the married woman’s “capacities, reason, 
and moral being were likewise resuscitated.”100  By freeing the married woman to 
exercise sovereignty over her assets, the law treated her as a fully reasonable and 
responsible moral agent, capable of exercising the “right of disposition, control, and 
management.”101  She obtained “distinct and independent rights,” which she had the 
separate responsibility to prosecute and defend in courts of justice.102  She was free 
to choose, and she was expected to accept the consequences of her choices, for good 
or ill; the law now respected her “faculties and powers as a moral agent” in relation 
to her property.103 
As the Texas court recognized, owner sovereignty serves the achievement of 
honoring one’s commitments to oneself and to others.  It enables the owner 
sovereign through the exercise of personal autonomy to make pre-moral choices, 
which then become binding reasons for her.  In short, it empowers her to exercise her 
faculties of human agency, her reason. And because property respects her choices as 
rational, it respects her as a person. 
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4.  Recent Criticisms of Owner Sovereignty 
A group of influential scholars has recently called into question the prudence and 
justness of owner sovereignty.  These scholars would, inter alia, redistribute 
property entitlements in favor of collective decision-makers and the poor on the 
basis of various moral principles, including a “social-obligation norm.”104  They 
doubt that landowners are likely to use their land more wisely than state actors, and 
they generally favor a stronger role for law, and a weaker role for sovereign owners, 
in the use and disposition of property.105 
Their “Statement of Progressive Property”106 has ignited a controversy over the 
autonomy that property owners currently enjoy, which is to use and dispose of their 
own assets.107  A full discussion of that controversy is beyond the scope of this 
article.  But two observations are in order.  First, it is instructive to note that the 
parties on both sides of the controversy largely agree that the purpose of property is 
to serve basic, incommensurable goods, and that whoever has the authority to govern 
property ought to exercise that authority to promote those goods.108  Being in favor 
of virtue and human flourishing does not entail being opposed to strong private 
property protections. 
Second, there is a real controversy.  It is not at all clear that the authors of the 
Progressive Statement have successfully cast doubt upon the wisdom of owner 
sovereignty.  Their position is consistent with Authoritative Paternalism, which 
cannot tolerate the strong protections that state property law affords to the owner 
sovereign.  But it is far from clear that property owners are in general incapable of 
exercising their sovereignty for good. 
Indeed, Henry Smith criticizes the Progressive Statement authors for their 
insufficient attention to the means by which their proposal is supposed to serve the 
basic goods on which everyone agrees.  The problem in Smith’s view is not that 
private property fails to promote human flourishing (it does not fail) but rather that 
the critics of owner sovereignty are impatient with the “mysterious way” in which 
property serves human goods.109  That everyone favors human flourishing (and its 
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constituent goods) does not entail that redistribution of property entitlements is the 
best means to achieve it, a case that the authors of the Progressive Statement must 
make for their argument to succeed, but have not made.110 
B.  Land Use Regulation 
Lesson Two: The State Properly Restricts Exercises of Personal Autonomy That 
Cause Harm 
 
States do not permit property owners to exercise unfettered autonomy in the use 
and disposition of their assets.  As property professors hasten to point out, the maxim 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas111 does not by itself resolve very many property 
disputes, but it is a guiding principle in property law.  If it means anything, it must 
mean that owner sovereignty does not entitle a property owner to destroy common 
human goods.  So, for example, the famous case of Katko v. Briney112 stands for the 
proposition that one cannot lawfully mount a spring-loaded shotgun in one’s 
unoccupied building to harm trespassers who intrude during one’s absence.  One 
cannot be permitted to destroy another’s life or health, even in defense of one’s 
property. 
In a foil to Wisconsin’s decision in Jacque, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
State v. Shack113 declined to enforce a criminal trespass provision against two men, 
Tejeras and Shack, who entered a farm without the farmer’s permission for the 
purpose of providing medical and legal services to migrant workers who were 
residing there.114  The text of the statute clearly prohibited any trespass by one who 
was forbidden to enter by the owner of the land.115  It did not foreclose the argument 
that Tejeras and Shack might be considered invitees of the migrant workers, and 
therefore not trespassers.  The case could have been disposed of rather 
uncontroversially on that ground.  But rather than take that obvious way out, the 
court drilled all the way down to first principles and built an argument against 
impregnable owner sovereignty. 
The court began its analysis with the declamation, “Property rights serve human 
values.”116  This fact the court considered both the source of, and a limitation upon, 
property rights themselves.  The court stated, “[a] man’s right in his real property of 
course is not absolute.”117  The maxim that one should use his property so as not to 
injure others expresses the “inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there 
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must be an accommodation when they meet.”118  The court ruled that there had been 
no trespass because, the farmer’s owner sovereignty did all of the accommodating. 
The court did not clearly indicate what it meant by its reference to human values.  
But one can speculate based upon the facts of the case.  That Tejeras and Shack 
entered the farm to provide medical and legal services suggests that they intended to 
serve the health of the migrant workers there, and to protect their rights.  Health is of 
course an aspect of the basic good of life.  Justice is entailed in the requirements of 
practical reasonableness.119  Owner sovereignty therefore gives way when it is used 
to threaten human goods. 
This principle appears throughout property law, particularly the law of land use.  
State laws contain and authorize numerous types of restrictions and controls on 
owner sovereignty.  But perhaps the most dramatic is the zoning ordinance.  Zoning 
ordinances anticipate property disputes ex ante, and coercively regulate and restrict 
many aspects of land use for the purpose of coordinating the action of landowners.  
Indeed, zoning ordinances attempt to forfend some actions that are unlikely even to 
give rise to private disputes, such as the aesthetic appearance of structures and 
energy conservation.120 
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Every state authorizes its municipalities to enact zoning ordinances.121  Following 
the now-canonical formulation from Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty 
Company,122 state zoning enabling statutes generally authorize land use regulations 
to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare123 and, in many states, 
morals.124  These state interests are understood to be non-arbitrary, so they must have 
some foundation in rational values.  It is beyond the province of this article to 
explore what the connection might be.125  It is sufficient to note that property uses 
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often implicate states’ interests, that those state interests are understood to protect or 
promote intelligible goods, and that the state has the authority to restrict property 
owner sovereignty in order to promote or protect those goods. 
That the ubiquitous use of zoning ordinances is uncontroversial suggests 
widespread agreement that property owners should not be permitted to use their 
assets in such a way as to jeopardize or harm certain community interests.  And one 
would expect this limitation on autonomy to be uncontroversial because it is 
consistent with all of the reasoned, defensible accounts of autonomy described in 
Part II.  Notably, that this limitation is uncontroversial suggests that Untrammeled 
Autonomy is untenable.  If the basic goods are in fact common goods, and not 
merely individual goods, then exercising untrammeled autonomy is bound to harm 
someone and undermine that person’s own autonomy. 
C.  Charitable Tax Deductions 
Lesson Three: Personal Autonomy Is an Important Condition of the Realization 
of Reflexive Basic Goods 
 
That the best discussions of the moral value of choice and autonomy address 
taxation policy is no accident.126  Taxation is an exercise of coercion that every 
citizen experiences and it presents a challenge to the idea that autonomy has value.  
That challenge is answerable,127 but this is not the place to explore the answers.  
Rather, one specific tax policy raises a particularly relevant concern.  Many states, 
following the United States government, allow taxpayers to deduct from their 
reported income donations that they have made to a charity.128  The charity deduction 
might appear to run contrary to the lesson gleaned in the previous section.  If states 
rightly act to protect and promote good ends by coercive means, why do states not 
simply confiscate those funds that taxpayers are currently donating to charity and 
direct them instead to the needs that the state has identified? 
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One possible explanation is economic.  Perhaps private charitable conduct is 
more efficient at meeting the needs of the disadvantaged than government 
redistribution.  But in a number of areas both the national government and state 
governments have determined that this is not the case.  For example, on the 
justification that private charity is ineffectual to provide adequate health care to the 
elderly and the poor, federal and state governments use coercive taxation to fund 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
An alternative explanation for the charitable deduction is that charity has value.  
Charity might be understood as a basic good, or as an instantiation of the basic good 
of practical reasonableness.  But in either case it seems uncontroversial to observe 
that charity is both objectively good and reflexive in nature.  That is, charity is 
valuable in and of itself, but the value of charity depends upon it being freely chosen.  
To coerce someone to be generous does not make that person charitable, it simply 
separates that person from his or her money. 
Charity, like all reflexive goods, must be internalized by the exercise of personal 
autonomy.  The act of charity has a profound effect on the donor’s identity; it makes 
the donor, to borrow from Finnis, “a different sort of person.”129  It makes a 
difference not only to the material condition of the recipient but also to the moral 
condition of the donor herself—her character.  The donor realizes something of 
value by giving freely and internalizes this value into her identity, as she makes the 
well-being of the recipient a new reason for her own action. 
The charitable act could not have this effect upon the charitable person if it were 
coerced.  One who is required by law to part with her money for the material comfort 
of another is not making the material comfort of the other person a reason for her 
action.  Instead, the coercion is the reason for her action.  She might, if she is a 
naturally empathetic and caring person, nevertheless internalize care and concern for 
poor people generally.  But she will not have established a moral connection with a 
particular recipient.  Nor will she have created for herself a new reason to behave in 
a generous manner. 
All of this seems quite consistent with the observations of Finnis and George 
about the reflexivity of some basic goods.  And this has important implications for 
the autonomy wars described in the Introduction.  Authoritative Paternalism 
occasionally overreaches because it fails to account for the reflexivity of some 
goods, such as charity and practical reasonableness.  The stated objective of 
requiring citizens to undertake certain economic actions, such as purchasing health 
insurance and paying taxes to support social safety nets, is not merely to provide for 
the needs of others but also to make citizens more responsible.  But the coercion 
used to achieve that end makes the end unachievable.  When the government 
requires citizens to provide financial support for social programs it deprives them of 
the opportunity to choose.  And if they cannot choose, then citizens do not make 
charity a reason for their future actions. 
D.  Assisted Suicide 
Lesson Four: Some Autonomous Acts Are Valueless 
 
When Montana became the third state to legalize assisting suicide, joining 
Washington and Oregon, it left Idaho as a regional outlier.  In contrast to its 
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neighbors, Idaho has not abolished the common law prohibition against the 
assistance of suicide.  Instead, Idaho retains the common law, which treats assisting 
suicide as a crime.  Is Idaho reasonable to hold out against the regional trend?  If 
Idaho were simply to look around at its neighbors it might have cause to doubt its 
position. 
Some claim that respect for personal autonomy places principled limits on the 
state’s interest in preserving life.130  That is, the case for legalizing assisted suicide 
rests not merely, or even predominantly, on practical arguments about alleviating 
suffering; it is not a matter of contingent judgment about prudential considerations.  
Rather, as the argument goes, the moral case for prohibiting assisted suicide, which 
begins with a principle of respect for human life, is in conflict with a moral case for 
legalizing assisted suicide, which rests upon a principle of respect for personal 
autonomy.  The only way to resolve the ostensible conflict between the value of life 
and the value of autonomy is to legalize self-harmful autonomous acts, such as 
receiving assistance in suicide.131 
Thus one legalization proponent argues that each individual ought to be free to 
“lead a life that makes use of her distinctive abilities and satisfies her particular 
aspirations and desires.”132  The valuation of human life is a matter of subjective 
judgment about how fulfilling one’s life actually is, and suicide is “an appropriate, 
though not obligatory, response when there is no further possibility of living a 
fulfilling life.”133  In other words, any value in life is to be found only in the extrinsic 
ends that it serves.  When those ends cease to be valuable, it is reasonable to destroy 
one’s own life. 
This assessment of the value of human life rests upon a conception of 
Untrammeled Autonomy, which takes self-made reasons to be the only reasons for 
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action.  If autonomy is the supreme value then all other human goods, including 
human life, are contingent.  There is no “uniform ethos,” no “higher purposes,”134 no 
common goods.  Human action should be directed only toward “self-defined goals 
that will provide the most subjectively satisfying life.”135 
If this argument holds, and the value of human life is contingent, as a matter of 
subjective evaluation, then the moral case for legalizing assisted suicide deserves 
careful attention.  But the judgments of state lawmakers reflect ambivalence, at most, 
about the principled case for respecting personal autonomy in the area of assisted 
suicide.  A survey of state laws discloses a much more limited role for personal 
autonomy in this area.  Only three states—Oregon, Washington, and Montana—have 
de-criminalized assisted suicide.  The other forty-seven states maintain criminal 
penalties for the act.  And though no state punishes the act of suicide itself, no state 
law expressly permits it. 
Proponents of legalizing assisted suicide sometimes point out that states do not 
punish the act of suicide itself.136  But this fact cannot bear the weight that 
legalization proponents would place on it.  In its landmark Glucksberg decision, the 
Supreme Court recognized that de-criminalization of suicide “did not represent an 
acceptance of suicide; rather, as [Connecticut] Chief Justice [Zephania] Swift 
observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish 
the suicide’s family for his wrongdoing.”137  Justice Souter wrote separately to 
advocate for a liberty interest in assisted suicide.  He nevertheless acknowledged that 
the state abolished punishments for suicide “largely because the common-law 
punishment of forfeiture was rejected as improperly penalizing an innocent 
family.”138 
Further evidence that de-criminalization was primarily about the effects of 
punishment, and not about permitting or approving suicide, can be found in state 
case reports.  Despite the inefficacy of punishing suicide, many states continue to 
identify volitional suicide as a crime139—an act that is “ethically reprehensible and 
inconsistent with the public welfare,”140 and “unlawful and criminal as malum in 
se.”141  Less than 40 years ago the Supreme Court acknowledged constitutionally 
unchallenged prohibitions against suicide.142  As one state court explained, “[s]uicide 
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is none the less criminal because no punishment can be inflicted.  It may not be 
indictable because the dead cannot be indicted.”143 
Not only criminal law but also state property law expresses disapprobation of 
volitional suicide.  Indeed, autonomous suicidal acts actually earn greater 
disapproval in state property law than suicidal acts that are driven by depression or 
mental illness.  A freely-chosen suicide cannot serve as the anticipated death that 
completes a gift causa mortis.144  This prohibition is justified on the ground that the 
courts should not honor a gift that was conditioned upon “the commission of a 
felony by the giver, and that felony [is] of the highest form.”145  The unenforceable 
gift is conditioned upon a “grave public wrong.”146  Enforcement would be 
inconsistent with states’ “consistent views disfavoring suicide.”147 
State budgetary priorities reflect disapprobation of suicide.  Even the few states 
that have de-criminalized assisted suicide today invest resources in suicide 
prevention.  Like many other states, Washington subsidizes crisis counseling 
services to dissuade suicidal acts.148  Counselors employed in that state apparently 
have the unenviable task of distinguishing between those suicidal decisions that are 
worthy of deference and those that are not. 
State tort law also aims to discourage suicide.  Most states recognize in law a 
privilege from tort liability for intervening in a suicide attempt.149  The privilege 
covers any interference in self-destruction or self-injury.  Also, many states permit 
involuntary commitment of one who, due to a mental illness, is likely to harm 
himself.150  Significantly, these laws make no provision for subjective or utilitarian 
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valuations of life.  The person who interferes in the suicidal act is not required to 
weigh the instrumental value of the life saved, either to the suicidal person or to the 
community.  This reflects the intrinsic, non-contingent value of human life.  A 
suicide harms both the individual and the community simply because it causes the 
loss of a human life; the value of the life is neither subjective nor relative to other 
considerations. 
So, forty-seven states prohibit assisted suicide.  And the other three retain 
numerous legal provisions designed to discourage and even prevent suicide.  Are all 
of these laws rational?  Are there good reasons for states to limit the freedom of 
citizens to give and receive assistance in committing suicide?  In short, yes.  The 
most important of these reasons is what some philosophers call the inviolability-of-
life principle.151  This principle has a long history in both philosophy and law.  It has 
been recognized “in most, if not all, civilised [sic] societies throughout the modern 
world.”152  And it is still reflected today in the provisions of state law just 
considered. 
The inviolability-of-life principle holds that human life is a basic good.  It is one 
of those goods that Raz, Dworkin, Finnis, and George all affirmed has intrinsic 
value; it is valuable in and of itself. It follows that, since human life is a reason for 
action in itself, one can and should refrain from “actions intended to do it harm.”153 
The inviolability-of-life principle rules out assisted suicide and euthanasia, 
though it does not require that measures must always be taken to keep human beings 
alive.154  Sometimes one’s reason for choosing life might be defeated by some other 
reason, but it can never be reasonable to intend to cause death, to have the 
destruction of life as one’s purpose.  So, for example, a fireman or a soldier who 
risks his own life to save another, knowing that his death might result, but not 
intending it, acts reasonably.  Similarly, one who refuses a drastic and intrusive 
medical treatment that might (or might not) save one’s life is not committing 
suicide.155  But one never has a reason deliberately to destroy innocent human life, 
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even one’s own life.  For the same reason, it can never be reasonable to assist 
another person in taking her own life.  Thus, states reasonably prohibit assisted 
suicide. 
That states treat human life as inviolable suggests an important limitation upon 
personal autonomy.  Suicide consists of the deliberate destruction of a basic human 
good (life) for the realization of no other intelligible good.156  It is thus an irrational 
act.  That suicide is performed autonomously does not render the act reasonable, say 
state lawmakers.  Indeed, an autonomous suicide destroys autonomy itself.  When a 
life ends, all of the exercises of personal autonomy that we recognize as valuable 
also come to an end.  By its very operation the act of suicide assures that the actor 
will never again realize any valuable ends, including those goods that are reflexive in 
nature.157 
E.  Compulsory Education Laws 
Lesson Five: Not All Basic Goods Appear to Be Reflexive 
 
                                                          
John Keown and David Jones have memorably explained the distinction between chosen 
death and death as a side effect.  To claim that the heroism of personal sacrifice justifies 
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process of self-determination.  Id. 
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Every state requires children either to attend school or to obtain an equivalent 
education elsewhere.158  By requiring children and their parents affirmatively to 
pursue educational goals, these laws burden a liberty interest.159  The Supreme Court 
in 1925 held that a state compulsory education law, which required all children to 
attend public schools, unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children in their custody.160  The 
Court reasoned, 
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. 
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations.161 
Thus, as the Court later affirmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder,162 parents retain the right to 
direct the manner and venues in which their children will be educated. 
Nevertheless, this liberty interest does not free parents and children from the 
reach of state educational requirements altogether.  The Court in Pierce noted that no 
question was raised about the power of states to regulate schools, to require that all 
children of proper age attend some school, and to require the teaching of “certain 
studies plainly essential to good citizenship.”163  Coercion is permitted, within limits, 
and as a means to particular ends. 
Yoder did not disturb this ruling.  In Yoder, the Supreme Court famously held 
that Amish children could be exempted from compulsory education beyond the 
eighth grade.  But the justification for this decision was not a general liberty interest 
but rather Free Exercise protection.164  The Amish claimants did not rest their claim 
upon personal autonomy or personal preferences.  To the contrary, obedience to their 
religiously-informed consciences meant obedience to their community’s doctrines.165 
Also, the Court in Yoder took pains to affirm the rationality of compulsory 
education laws.  “There is no doubt as to the power of a State,” the Court declaimed, 
“having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable 
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regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”166  The point, for present 
purposes, is not that the Court perceived the value of knowledge resting in its 
instrumental usefulness for producing good citizens.  Rather, the point is that the 
value of knowledge was not destroyed by the compulsion directed toward its 
acquisition. 
The rationality of compulsory education laws raises the possibility that coerced 
pursuit of at least one basic good has intelligible value.  If compulsory education 
laws are reasonable then there must be some conclusive reason or reasons for them.  
If knowledge is not a basic good, or if it is reflexive and its value is contingent on its 
being freely chosen for the right reasons, there exists no intelligible reason to force 
children to acquire it, or to force children’s parents to comply with the acquisition. 
Similarly, unless aesthetic experience has intelligible value even when coerced 
there would be no reason to require children to sit through music and art classes.  
Unless health has intelligible value when coerced there would be no reason to 
compel physical education.  But of course knowledge, aesthetic experience, and 
health do provide intelligible reasons for such laws.  That every state has some form 
of compulsory education law illustrates that rational minds grasp the value of these 
coercive measures. 
A principle of Untrammeled Autonomy should entail that compulsory education 
laws are unjust.  As Finnis has observed, the principle articulated in Casey should 
entail that “since parents have a constitutionally protected right to provide non-State 
education for their children if they so choose, they must equally have the right to 
decide to give their children no education.”167 
And the claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable should entail that 
compulsory education laws are irrational.  To observe that children are different than 
adults does not by itself resolve the problem.  Some relevant difference between 
children and adults might be a reason for not coercing adults to attend school, but it 
cannot justify coercing children to attend school.  To require the child’s attendance is 
to override the autonomy of either the child or the parent, or both.  That cannot be 
justified except on consequentialist grounds, which is another way of saying that it 
cannot be justified. 
Alternatively, one might argue that children are not capable of exercising 
autonomy because they do not create life plans the way that adults do.168  Or perhaps 
they have a very limited capacity for autonomy because they do not make their own 
reasons for action as adults do, or they do so imperfectly.169  Thus the state might 
rationally coerce children to acquire knowledge without threatening children’s 
autonomy.  But just as this line of argument resolves one difficulty it raises other 
problems.  Children realize basic goods other than autonomy, such as life, health, 
and knowledge.  If autonomy is a basic good then one will expect it to be good for 
children as it is for adults, just as the other basic goods are good for children.  If 
children lack the capacity for autonomy but enjoy the capacity to realize other basic 
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goods, that fact would cast doubt upon the idea that autonomy is in fact equally as 
basic as other goods. 
More fundamentally, someone is exercising an autonomy interest in directing a 
child’s education.  If not the child, then a parent or guardian must have the capacity 
and freedom to choose how the child will be educated.  But state law does not 
respect the autonomy of parents to decide whether the child will be educated.  The 
law recognizes a liberty interest in parents to choose the manner and method of 
instruction, but that liberty interest does not include a right to leave the child in 
ignorance. 
It thus appears that the realization of some basic goods—at least knowledge, 
aesthetic experience, and health—can rationally be coerced.  At least all fifty states 
and the United States Supreme Court think so.  Therefore the value of some goods 
does not depend in any way on the exercise of personal autonomy.  This assessment 
appears to meet widespread acceptance among lawmakers. 
F.  Legalized Marijuana Use 
Lesson Six: Neither a Principle of Personal Autonomy nor the Unconditional 
Value of Some Basic Goods Conclusively Resolves Every Controversial Legal Issue 
 
Several states have recently decriminalized simple possession and use of 
marijuana.170  This policy decision implicates both autonomy and the protection of 
other goods, such as health and practical reasonableness.  But unlike the areas of 
state law considered above, the controversy in this corner does not admit an obvious 
answer.  It is instructive to examine why not. 
The argument for criminalization proceeds from the observation that recreational 
marijuana use injures a basic human good, namely health, in service of no other 
rational end.  (The pleasure that the user experiences is a sub-rational motivation, not 
a reason for using.)  Furthermore, many marijuana users become addicted to 
marijuana and more destructive substances.  These addictions often injure the user’s 
relationships with other people, causing harm to the basic good of community.  
Health and community are non-reflexive basic goods; they retain their intelligible 
value even when they are not freely chosen.  To deter injury to these goods, the state 
reasonably prohibits marijuana use and possession. 
But this case can easily be overstated.  Some chemical substances have greater 
deleterious effects than others.  Alcohol is more or less destructive than marijuana, 
and both are arguably less destructive than heroin.  And states permit the 
consumption of alcohol, in moderation and with certain restrictions, so why not 
marijuana?  Once we frankly acknowledge that we are engaged in line drawing, how 
do we avoid being arbitrary about it? 
The argument for legalization proceeds from the observation that criminalization 
will also harm the drug user in an important way, by deflecting the user from 
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realizing the goods of autonomy and practical reasonableness.  One does not act 
freely or uprightly when one chooses to avoid drug abuse only out of fear of 
punishment.  However, it is easy to overstate this case, as well.  It is particularly easy 
to underestimate the harm to users and their friends and family that results from 
much use and abuse of narcotics. 
Moreover, legalization itself might deflect some marijuana users from exercising 
practical reasonableness, particularly those who are prone to abuse the drug.  George 
observes that prohibiting harmful acts protects both the potential victims of harm and 
the immoral actors themselves.  “For, by deterring such acts, the law may prevent 
people from habituating themselves to corrupting vices which will more or less 
gradually erode their character and will to resist.”171  Drug addiction, of course, is the 
paradigmatic instance of habituation to a corrupting vice, which erodes the character 
and will of the user. 
So it might reasonably be argued that the degree of harm from either 
criminalization or legalization is less than immediately clear.  Even when confined to 
moral considerations, this is a complicated issue.  It becomes even more complicated 
once one includes prudential considerations.  Will legalization or criminalization 
more dramatically incentivize a criminal black market in narcotics?  Does 
criminalization actually deter potential users?  Does it deter addicts?  These 
questions admit of empirical answers, but that does not make them easy questions to 
resolve. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
What can be said about personal autonomy then?  State lawmakers by and large 
reject both Untrammeled Autonomy and Authoritative Paternalism.  With Raz, 
Finnis, George, and Dworkin, and against the Untrammeled Autonomists, they 
affirm that the value of autonomy is limited, and that one cannot make an 
unreasonable act reasonable simply by choosing it.  With Raz, Finnis, George, and 
Dworkin, and against the Authoritative Paternalists, they also affirm that personal 
autonomy is an important condition of human flourishing because it enables people 
to make pre-moral choices and to realize reflexive basic goods. 
More can be said.  State lawmakers apparently believe personal autonomy to be 
an important principle with moral implications.  But they recognize important 
limitations upon the reach of that principle.  Personal autonomy is reasonably 
curtailed when exercised to cause harm.  Though it must be protected to enable 
people space to make pre-moral choices, and to realize reflexive basic goods, it need 
not be respected in all cases.  The value of at least one basic good—human life—
cannot reasonably be reduced to mere instrumentality for the sake of respecting 
personal autonomy.  And autonomy adds nothing of value to an irrational act, such 
as suicide.  Some goods—knowledge, aesthetic experience, and health—are 
reasonably realized through coercive means. 
So some clear principles emerge.  But there remains significant room for 
reasonable disagreement about the role and limitations of personal autonomy in areas 
of public policy where these clear principles are not in play.  The law need not 
prohibit every harmful or irresponsible act.  And there are good reasons to believe 
that it should not do so.  Therefore lawmakers who seek to do good with intellectual 
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humility will recognize that many questions are not easily resolved simply by 
invoking or rejecting a principle of personal autonomy. 
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